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1989). As to the visual system, the pattern of connectivity and
chemoarchitecture of the two major ascending visual pathways to
the forebrain is closely comparable in birds and mammals (Gün-
türkün 1996). At present, it is unclear whether all these similari-
ties reflect homoplasy (convergent evolution) or homology (shared
evolutionary ancestry). But, whatever the answer, the possibility
that some very general computational rules are conserved, or re-
invented, in classes whose lineages have been separated some
250–300 million years ago is intriguing. It suggests that there are
important constraints related to the geometrical and physical
properties of the world that must have been incorporated in the
design of any efficient biological visual system.
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Abstract: Shepard’s notion of “internalisation” is better interpreted as a
simile than a metaphor. A fractal encoding model of visual perception is
sketched, in which image elements are transformed in such a way as to
maximise symmetry with the current input. This view, in which the trans-
forming system embodies what has been internalised, resolves some prob-
lems raised by the metaphoric interpretation.
[hecht; shepard]
shepard has argued that the human brain has evolved in such a
way as to internalise the most general principles that operate in
the physical world. Although acknowledging the sweep and sug-
gestiveness of this idea, most commentators, such as hecht,
question the usefulness of the metaphor of internalisation and ar-
gue that it is falsified when made specific, and unhelpful when it
remains general. It is with some trepidation, therefore, that I sug-
gest that a quite concrete instantiation of these most general prin-
ciples can provide useful insights into the way in which perceptual
and cognitive processes might conceivably operate.
Independently of the validity of internalisation, it seems obvi-
ous that a comprehensive and coherent explanation of the inter-
actions between brain processes and the physical world (and be-
tween different sets of brain processes) must be in terms of a
common conceptual framework. In agreement with proponents of
nonlinear dynamical analyses (e.g., Port & Van Gelder 1995), I
would argue that the most general common framework is that of
geometry.
Within this framework, two of the most general and powerful
notions for explaining and guiding our understanding of the phys-
ical universe are: (1) symmetry under some set of transformations;
and (2) some form of minimum (i.e., optimisation) principle.
These are the two constraining principles, in particular, that shep-
ard argues have been internalised. In proposing that, in default
conditions, human perception tends to conform to the principles
of kinematic geometry, shepard attempts to map these concepts
directly onto mental functioning.
I wish to suggest that a more useful interpretation of shepard’s
position is that perceptual and cognitive processes operate as if
such general principles as symmetry and optimisation had some-
how been internalised. In order to justify this belief, I should like
to present what is still more a thought experiment than a well
worked-out hypothesis. This idea takes its inspiration from recent
developments in fractal geometry and, in particular, from the use
of fractal encoding to compress and generate visual images. First,
a very brief explanation of these ideas may be helpful.
Fractal geometry is concerned with the analysis of complex
lines, surfaces, and objects that are comparable in complexity to
the outlines and composition of natural objects and textures. As an
example, a fractal curve can be generated by taking a simple seed
element, such as a straight line (—), and making two reduced
copies of it (– –). These reduced copies are subjected to a set of
transformations (e.g., ~). Two reduced copies are then made of
each line element in this output and the same set of transforma-
tions is again applied. The process can continue indefinitely, but,
in practice, five or six iterations are sufficient to approach the res-
olution of the system used to display (or to view) the resulting
curve. More complex sets of networked probabilistic generation
processes can also be used to create highly complex images.
Fractal curves and surfaces are interesting for several reasons.
First, such curves and surfaces frequently resemble natural ob-
jects and environments (Mandelbrot 1983; Prusinkiewicz & Lin-
denmayer 1990). Second, like certain ferns, fractal objects and im-
ages exhibit “self-similarity” (i.e., their structure is statistically
similar at different scales of magnification, so that a small part re-
sembles the whole structure). Third, all the information necessary
to generate a fractal curve can be represented by the parameters
of a set (or collage) of some half dozen transformations.
It can be proved that any image, however complex, can in prin-
ciple be represented by the parameters of a set of fractal gene-
ration processes. Because of this, as Peitgen et al. (1992, p. 259)
remark, “Fractal geometry offers a totally new and powerful mod-
elling framework for such encoding problems. In fact, we could
speculate that our brain used fractal-like encoding schemes.” My
proposed thought experiment is that we try to work out some of
the consequences of taking this suggestion seriously.
For example, as a first step in this direction, K. Preiss and I have
devised a program that takes any regular fractal curve (e.g., the
well-known Koch curve) and uses a plausibly constrained se-
quence of transformation operations to discover (by mapping the
transformed patterns onto the original) the reduction factor, num-
ber of copies, translation, rotation and reflection parameters, and
the number of iterations required to generate a copy of the curve.
This copy may then be matched with the original. I propose that
such a program can represent a highly simplified, toy model of one
way that the perceptual process might conceivably operate.
To make this model more general, we might go on to speculate
that the visual system carries out a collage of the simplest trans-
formations on elements of the visual image that will maximise
symmetries between the transformed output and the current im-
age (and with changes in that image), given the rate of change in
the input and the physical parameters controlling the transform-
ing systems. That is, visual perception is conceived as the attrac-
tor-like output of a dynamic, generative transformational system
that “resonates” with the current input.
From this perspective, the transforming system embodies what
has been internalised. The principles of symmetry maximisation
and optimisation are obvious candidates as hypotheses for de-
scribing the operation of the system. However, hypotheses in
these terms are now empirically testable. Even if true as descrip-
tions of the system, they are not used to describe the end result of
perception, but the operation of the perceptual system as it inter-
acts with the environment. As a result, the various examples cited
by commentators as falsifying the internalisation notion, become
instead empirical findings that may or may not be consistent with
the predicted output of the system.
If we think of very general constraints as (possibly) applying to
the system that processes external information, then the opposi-
tion between well-resolved geometric regularities and “more ab-
stract” statistical regularities, to which hecht draws attention,
need not arise. Perception is now seen as determined by the dis-
tribution of active transformations that generate an output that is
maximally symmetric (statistically) with the current input. That is,
perceptual responses are not bound by group-theoretic require-
ments of perfect symmetry. At the same time, the repertoire of
transformations that the system calls on may embody evolutionary
developments reflecting bodily and external constraints. Thus, the
system can incorporate the kind of prior knowledge (about any
and every stimulus) that the Bayesian approach to perception im-
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plausibly ascribes to cognition. (It might even incorporate some
aspects of hecht’s “externalisation” hypothesis.)
A further consequence of this approach is that it may be able to
accommodate one of the features of responses to nongeneric
views of objects that otherwise seem puzzling. This is the sudden
sharp change in perception that occurs (as when a pencil is viewed
end-on). To do this, however, it may be important not to underes-
timate the richness of the information that may be used to select
the appropriate transformations.
Specifically, in our program, we used a Hausdorff distance met-
ric to compare the transformed and the original images (Ruck-
lidge 1996). The process of measuring the Hausdorff distance be-
tween two sets of points, A and B, takes into account the distances
from each point in set A to every point in set B and the distances
from each point in B to every point in A. This measuring process
yields a rich landscape of information. In essence, each point in an
array has a “view” of every other point.
For example, when applied to a (single) Glass figure, among
the distribution of inter-point distances, one single value pre-
dominates; all that is necessary is to select the transformation
that will move a point through that distance. In other words,
from this perspective, some perceptual phenomena that have
been seen as problematic because of a correspondence problem
(which points go with which), appear to be over- rather than un-
der-determined.
The generative transformational approach that I suggest is
worth exploring is congruent with some other recent work in cog-
nition, such as Feldman’s (1997) treatment of one-shot catego-
rization and Leyton’s (1992) speculation that we may be sensitive
to the “process-history” of objects, where this history is inter-
preted as a sequence of transformations from some maximally
symmetric original state. However, its main merit, in the present
context, is that it can provide a computational model, in terms of
which shepard’s internalisation hypothesis retains its generality.
Perhaps a further appealing feature is that this is achieved by a
concrete instantiation of two notions central to Shepard’s thinking:
transformation and a generative system.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I wish to thank Michael Lee for helpful comments.
What’s in a structure?
Virgil Whitmyer
Department of Psychology, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405.
Vwhitmye@indiana.edu
Abstract: Shepard’s general approach provides little specific information
about the implementation of laws in brains. Theories that turn on an iso-
morphism between some domain and the brain, of which Shepard’s is one,
do not provide specific detail about the implementation of the structures
they propose. But such detail is a necessary part in an explanation of mind.
[shepard]
I have a general worry about projects like shepard’s. Consider a
cousin of shepard’s theory which has, I take it, a similar goal. The
Gestalt psychologists were out to uncover the structure of the
brain. Köhler expresses a desire to explore the “terra incognita”
between stimulation and responsive behavior (1929, p. 54). One
might consider such neural territory qua realizer of phenomenal
states, looking, for example, for opponent process cells that real-
ize sensations of red and green, yellow and blue. On the other
hand, she might be interested in the brain qua representer, in
which case she might ask about the mapping that takes neural el-
ements into a represented domain. Each project requires a map-
ping between different types of domain: in the former case from
phenomenal to brain states, and in the latter from representations
to representeds. Köhler’s principle interest was in the mapping
from phenomenal to brain states. I’m not entirely sure which map-
ping shepard is principally interested in, despite his usual talk
about “representation.”
In each case theorists have used the idea that the neural domain
is isomorphic to what we might call the target domain (be that a
set of representations or a set of phenomenal states). The idea be-
hind such theories is that the domains share a structure. This iden-
tity of structure allows us to learn about the neural structure by
studying the target structure. The most simplistic description of
the Gestalt case has it that when we find a circular percept in our
“behavioral environment” (Koffka 1935), we can infer that “con-
comitant physiological processes” (Köhler 1929, p. 61) share this
circular structure. And while few theorists today hold that there is
such a straightforward mapping, the very same principle lies be-
hind the idea that the psychological color space with its three axes
maps onto a neural coordinate space with sets of opponent process
cells realizing each axis (e.g., Hurvich 1981).
The same problem haunts every version of such a theory, but it
is most easily seen in the spatial case. We know that the sense in
which the neural domain has a circular structure will differ from
the sense in which the phenomenal domain has that structure –
the neural version won’t look circular to an observer gazing at the
cortex. There is a trivial sense in which it has a circular structure
just if it realizes a circular percept, but I take it a theorist inter-
ested in the nature of the brain would want a better description,
like a map of the surface of the cortex. Yet, however we charac-
terize the structure shared by the phenomenal and the neural do-
main, it must be abstract enough to describe both domains; so it
cannot be written in neural terms. Certainly shepard’s are not.
The case is the same with structures characterized otherwise: if
the terms in a functional characterization (a type of structure) do
not refer “transparently” to entities and relations in the domain,
then we need a translation into the particulars of a domain. Some
(e.g., Fodor) maintain that psychological laws are irreducible,
hence that no translation is required. But I doubt that shepard is
of this school.
shepard has famously invoked isomorphism as well. He writes
that “the default motions that are experienced in the absence of
external support are just the ones that reveal, in their most pris-
tine form, the internalized kinematics of the mind and, hence,
provide for the possibility of an invariant psychological law” (tar-
get article, sect. 1.7). These laws do not directly govern brains, any
more than the “next-to” relation in the visual field tells us about
the next-to relation in cortical cells. Such judgments are reports
about the structure of a state space of subjective states, a structure
shared by the brain. Shepard has devised ingenious techniques
whereby we can learn about the structures of psychological do-
mains, and his present paper describes several. The large-scale
project is the same as Köhler’s: a set of laws that describe the be-
havior of phenomenal states (as those in accordance with Chasles’
theorem) describes a structure of those states. In contrast to Köh-
ler’s phenomenal circle, this structure is distributed over time and
counterfactual situations. But we must still say how this particular
structure is realized in neural stuff. If the realization is abstract,
how does this characterization constrain the possible configura-
tions of the neural realizers? How are we to arrive at a translation
from the characterization of the structure shepard proposes to
the description of a brain?
An important element in shepard’s argument is that selective
pressures favor the internalization of law-governed regularities.
He writes of “the benefits of representing objects as enduring 
entities” (emphasis mine). The most straightforward way such in-
ternalization might proceed is to internalize a domain that directly
realizes the laws that constitute the structure. But this is as im-
plausible as the direct realization of phenomenal structures; it is
more likely the case that we simulate the structure indirectly. But
here the distinctions between various domains are important. We
are out to find an informative description of the brain that tells us
either how it represents or how it realizes phenomenal states. But
the mapping from what is represented to how it is represented
(i.e., to the nature of the vehicle) is no more straightforward than
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